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CONSTITUTIONAL ASYMMETRY
Martin S. Flaherty*
INTRODUCTION
In one of their most underappreciated exchanges, Chico Marx
challenges one of Groucho's schemes, torturing the English language
in his heavy mock-Italian accent as he goes. After hearing enough,
Groucho looks straight into the camera and declares, "There's my
argument. Restrict immigration." In a similar vein, Bush v. Gore'
features all manner of tortured "constitution-talk. 3 Over the next
several weeks and months, more than a few critics will doubtless echo
Groucho and proclaim, "There's my argument. Take the Constitution
away from the courts."4
If the instant punditry is any guide, history will not treat the
Supreme Court's recent actions kindly. The Court's already familiar
missteps will keep law reviews well-stocked for some time to come.
The Court involved itself in a presidential election dispute for the first
time in history, relying on issues that quickly became peripheral.'
* Professor of Law & Co-Director, Joseph R. Crowley Program in International
Human Rights, Fordham Law School. My thanks to my colleague, Jim Fleming, for
taking the lead in organizing this symposium, and to the participants on my panel.
1. Monkey Business (Paramount Pictures 1931).
2. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (per curiam).
3. Mark Tushnet, Constitution-Talk and Justice-Talk, 69 Fordham L Rev. 1999
(2001) [hereinafter Tushnet, Constitution-Talk].
4. Cf Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away From the Courts (2000)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away] (arguing for a diminution of the
judiciary's role in constitutional interpretation).
5. Nor was the present author above this sort of thing. See, e.g., Martin Flaherty,
Editorial Letter, The Long Mard to the Oval Office, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7,2000, at A38
(condemning the Supreme Court for not dismissing Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000) (per curiam)); Greg B. Smith, Court's Split Edict
Comes Under Fire, Daily News (New York), Dec. 14, 2000, at 18 (quoting Martin
Flaherty's criticism of the plethora of opinions in Bush v. Gore).
6. Compare Bush v. Palm Beach County, 121 S. Ct. 471, 475 (2000) (per curiam)
(expressing concern about the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court interpreted
the state constitution as "circumscribing the legislature's authority under Article II"
of the U.S. Constitution), with Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 529-34 (2000) (per
curiam) (basing the decision on equal protection grounds rather than on Article II);
compare also Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 535 (Rehnquist, CJ., Scalia, J. & Thomas,
J. concurring) (expressing concern that the Florida Supreme Court interpreted the
election laws in violation of Article II), with Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 540
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Five Justices voted to stay the manual recounts ordered by the Florida
Supreme Court even though any fair consideration of the equities
clearly showed greater irreparable harm to Vice President Gore than
Governor Bush.7 The same five Justices determined that the Florida
Supreme Court had held that the state legislature had intended
December 12 to be a firm deadline to complete all recounts.8 The
opinion below, however, dealt with a different part of the statutory
scheme, placed greater emphasis on validating the right to vote, and
addressed the December 12 deadline only at the Supreme Court's
urging.' With no apparent basis in principle, the Court sought to limit
the radically progressive implications of its equal protection analysis
to the case at hand.10
All this lawyers, academics, and other constitutional professionals
will urge with gusto. Defenses, no less zealously, will also appear to
justify the Court's legal maneuvers. But either way, it is a safe bet
that the legal community will devote much less attention to Florida's
obviously incoherent election statutes, crazy quilt voting procedures,
or the extent of these and related problems nationwide. From this
perspective, the criticism of the Court that stands out is not that it
went too far in interfering with the electoral process on dubious legal
grounds, but that it did not go far enough by failing to secure an equal
right to vote. As Justice Breyer pointed out, if the slight variations in
manual recounts trigger equal protection concern, then so should the
much greater discrepancies that result from different voting
machines'-or, he might have added, antiquated technology, lack of
funding, or localized control. However apt, criticism of the Court's
legal reasoning will not answer the more basic questions. Was judicial
intervention, with all the warts lawyers are good at seeing, really
worse than the electoral process it supplanted, with blots that are less
evident, at least to those with law degrees? Once you take the
Constitution away from the Courts, what are you giving it to?
I. THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ASYMMETRY
Neither constitutional theory, discourse, nor scholarship is
especially good at answering these kind of questions. The Bush v.
Gore saga suggests why. Built into "constitution-talk," as currently
(Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J. & Breyer, J. dissenting) (stating that the Florida Supreme
Court's decision was consistent with the grant of authority in Article II).
7. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512, 513 (2000) (stay application) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
8. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525,533 (2000).
9. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1288-90 (Fla.
2000).
10. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 532 (2000).
11. Id. at 552 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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practiced, is a one-sidedness that can only be grasped from an outside
perspective. Modem constitutional analysis excels at subjecting what
courts do to withering critique, especially when what they do raises as
many questions as Bush v. Gore. It provokes somewhat less awe,
however, when applied to the democratic alternatives to judicial
action. Call this phenomenon "constitutional asymmetry."
Perhaps the best way to get the idea across is with exactly the type
of court-centered jargon that makes lawyers feel at home. On one
hand, constitutional professionals revel in applying "strict scrutiny" to
any act or theory of constitutional interpretation. As any first-year
student learns, under a strict scrutiny standard very little survives. 2
On the other hand, these same lawyers, scholars, even judges, accord
no more than "rational relationship" review to the ostensibly
democratic alternatives to judicial intervention. This happens even
though a good many of the assumptions about democratic processes
are romantic, even primitive. And as any student will also tell you,
once the rational relationship test is applied, elected officials get to do
pretty much what they want. 3
A couple of examples should suffice to show this asymmetry at
work. From the Right, consider Antonin Scalia. Justice Scalia has
famously devoted much of his professional life to arguing for an
extremely narrow judicial role in constitutional enforcement." He
has, moreover, expounded half of his case for this position at length,
almost always brilliantly. Applying strict scrutiny with devastating
12. See, e.g., Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 798-802 (1988)
(holding that North Carolina's charitable-solicitation statute failed to withstand First
Amendment strict scrutiny). For the notorious exception proving the rule, see
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment of persons of
Japanese ancestry notwithstanding application of strict scrutiny).
13. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding
Oklahoma statute prohibiting opticians from plying their trade in retail stores and
enforcing strict regulatory requirements under rational relationship scrutiny). But see
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,447-50 (1985) (upholding
a zoning ordinance that required a special use permit to establish group homes for the
mentally disabled as bearing a rational relation to government interests). The recent
trend in the Rehnquist Court appears to be toward striking down certain measures
despite rational relationship review, rather than recognizing categories of
fundamental rights that would invalidate government action under a higher level of
scrutiny. See, eg., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (using rational
relationship analysis to strike down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that
prevented the state from providing certain protections to gays and lesbians).
14. At least until recently. As is true of several of his colleagues, the same Justice
Scalia who decries judicial activism has few problems invalidating statutes in the name
of "states' rights," notwithstanding a lack of textual, structural or (credible) historical
support. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905-22 (1997) (invalidating a
federal statute out of state sovereignty concerns and relying on various historical
interpretations of federalism). For a critique of this decision, see Martin S. Flaherty,
Are We to be a Nation? Federal Power vs. "States' Rights" in Foreign Affairs, 70 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 1277, 1286-96 (1999).
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effect, the Justice has gleefully exposed the weak points in nearly
every school of constitutional interpretation worth considering. In
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,15 for example, he zeroed in on the critical
problem of determining the relevant tradition as a basis for
determining fundamental rights.16 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,17
he lambasted reliance on "reasoned judgment" as an empty concept
that enables judges to "rattle off a collection of adjectives that simply
decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice."18 Since
these and other interpretive approaches are so flawed, malleable, and
ultimately unprincipled, the Justice concludes that they cannot serve
as a principled basis for constitutional law. So sharp is his critical
scalpel that he has even conceded basic flaws in originalism-the one
interpretive stance he believes enjoys legitimacy, going so far as to say
he would abandon it in certain cases.19 Agree or disagree, these are
not trivial challenges.
Nonetheless, they still only account for half of his case. The other
half rests on the proposition that the alternative to unprincipled
judicial activism is democracy. And here the analysis looks very
different. What in the realm of interpretation was thick critique in the
context of self-government, largely amounts to paper-thin
assumptions. Pretty much all the Casey dissent says about the
alternative to the flawed judicial reasoning it has just exposed is that
there exists a superior "democratic outlet for the deep passions,... [a]
political forum that gives all participants, even the losers, the
satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight.""° Slightly more
striking, but no less representative, is the essentially one-sentence
treatment democracy receives in a book about the judicial role that
otherwise sharply criticizes expansive statutory and constitutional
interpretation.2 Absent is even a passing consideration of whether
the political forum is really-or even sufficiently- open to all those
who would participate, to what extent the process allows for a fair
hearing and an honest fight, and just how much losers do feel satisfied.
Instead, the working premise running through much of Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence is that legislative majorities in Harrisburg, Albany,
Tallahassee, or the District of Columbia fairly embody the considered
15. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
16. Id. at 127-28 n.6.
17. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
18. Id. at 983 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19. Perhaps ironically, he says he would do so based upon considerations
resembling reasoned judgment. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U.
Cin. L. Rev. 849,864 (1989).
20. Casey, 505 U.S. at 1002 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
21. The one sentence reads, "All of this [common law adjudication] would be an
unqualified good, were it not for a trend in government that has developed in recent
centuries, called democracy." Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law 9 (1997).
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will of the people of the states or of the nation. Yet it should not take
a political science degree to suspect that however flawed the per
curiam opinion in Bush v. Gore may be, legislative processes in
Florida may have a few problems of their own.
Yet such asymmetry is hardly a conservative monopoly. Here,
consider Akhil Amar from the Left. For all the considerable
differences between Justice Scalia and Professor Amar, in this regard
their differences turn out to be less extensive than expected. Perhaps
to his credit, Amar has not garnered the type of slash-and-burn
reputation associated with the Justice. That said, Amar can flex his
critical faculties with the best of them. In a recent analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment, he employs close textual and structural
readings to show how objections to Justice Black's famous total
incorporation thesis made by Louis Henkin undermined other
objections put forward by Raoul Berger and John Hart Ely, who in
turn undermine Henkin.Y Likewise, Amar earlier employed similar
analytic techniques to challenge the ostensibly well-settled notion that
Article V represented the exclusive method for amending the
Constitution.23
As with Scalia, the net result of the rigorous legal analysis privileges
not legal solutions, but democratic ones. In Amar's case, the
alternative to Article V could scarcely be more democratic-a simple,
national, majoritarian referendum. 4  And as with Scalia,
consideration of the democratic alternative is as wan as the
interpretive exploration is robust. Nowhere does Amar comparably
grapple with such questions as the likely outcomes of such referenda,
the implications of advertising costs and special interest money, the de
facto under-enfranchisement of racial minorities and recent
immigrants, or a host of other considerations about plebiscitarian
constitutionalism. He does, more than the Justice, deal with related
issues, such as the potential for less deliberation in a referendum than
in the formal amendment process.2 But even here, the response
mainly consists of a hopeful speculation about technology-enhancing
debate that contrasts with the rigorous constitutional examination that
had gone before. 6 Events would underscore these problems when the
next referendum to achieve national notoriety was the infamous
amendment to the Colorado Constitution prohibiting local measures
outlawing discrimination against homosexuals. 27 Likewise telling was
22. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 170-74
(1998).
23. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amnendment
Outside Article V, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 457 (1994).
24. Id. at 487-94.
25. Id. at 501-03.
26. Id. at 502-03.
27. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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not just that it took legal analysis from the Supreme Court to cure this
result,' but that Professor Amar's alternative solution was no less
legal than democratic.29
Constitutional asymmetry is one of those tendencies that is as
unremarked as it is obvious. Yet once it is noted, neither its causes
nor effects remain mysterious for long. Perhaps the most salient
reason for imbalanced constitutional discourse has to do with the
borders of constitutional law itself. Law schools, courts, journals,
conferences, symposia-all put a premium on sharpening a fairly
narrow set of tools to critique legal claims. Analogical reasoning,
close analysis of text and structure, and an adversarial stance toward
affirmative claims are just a few examples. Constitutional law may
more readily tolerate approaches from such associated disciplines as
history, political science, and philosophy, but the point is mainly
comparative. Notwithstanding legal realism and critical legal studies,
legal analysis remains sufficiently insular that it almost inevitably does
an inadequate job when considering matters that typically fall outside
the usual run of legal discourse, but which are nonetheless linked to
issues such discourse hopes to resolve. If the examples of Scalia and
Amar are at all representative, the workings of democratic self-
government provide just such an example in constitutional discourse.
This is not to say that there are not many constitutional scholars who
do attempt to challenge easy assumptions about representation,30 or
political parties, 31 or the merits of federalism.32 It is to say that they
remain exceptional.
Paradoxically, the primary effect of constitutional asymmetry may
well be precisely to move the Constitution beyond the courts. As
lawyers, judges, and constitutional scholars propose -then cannibalize
28. See id.
29. Specifically, Amar argued that the Colorado amendment was inconsistent with
the values underlying the Bill of Attainder Clause. Akhil Reed Amar, Attainment and
Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 203, 208-21 (1996).
30. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious
Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1589 (1993); Lani
Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black
Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077 (1991); Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and
Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of a Century, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 291 (1997);
Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1201
(1996).
31. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000).
32. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 Vand.
L. Rev. 1441 (1994); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 317
(1997); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free
State and Local Officials From State Legislatures' Control, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1201
(1999); Edward Rubin, Rational States?, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1433 (1997); Edward L. Rubin
& Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev.
903 (1994).
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one another's justifications for judicial action (whether broad or
narrow) -it follows that the resolution of conflict previously assigned
to the courts should default to the democratic process. This, at least,
would appear to be the principal alternative for a democracy. The
catch, however, is that the same imbalanced analysis that points to the
democratic alternative usually has almost nothing to say about the
alternative itself. Concede for a moment that neither text, structure,
history, tradition, nor reasoned judgment can sustain the claims to
individual rights in Griswold v. Connecticut3 and Roe v. Wade- on the
one hand, or to "states' rights" in Printz v. United States"5 and Alden v.
Maine36 on the other. The question remains as to whether the
proposition that the politicos who annually convene in Albany
actually represent the people of New York can survive the same
degree of withering scrutiny.
II. ANALYSIS FROM THE ASYMMETRICAL PERSPECTIVE
All of which brings matters to the four panelists' contributions at
hand. In addressing "The Constitution Outside the Courts," each of
the thoughtful and provocative articles under consideration of
necessity grapple with constitutional theory's asymmetrical bent.
Each one responds in a different way, which together makes them an
especially fruitful collection. Broadly speaking, they fall into two
distinct camps. On one side, Robert Nagel and Lawrence Sager not
only resist the usual consequence of asymmetrical analysis, they seek
to turn the tables. Despite various differences between them, both
scholars adhere to constitutional principles that they believe are
sufficiently defensible to control democratic processes, rather than the
other way around. Conversely, Mary Becker and Mark Tushnet cast
their lot with greater democracy, though from opposite tacks. Becker
for her part defends her position with an in-depth consideration of
how institutional design affects democratic legitimacy, in short, a more
symmetrical analysis. Tushnet's work, by contrast, seeks to employ
constitutional critique so thorough that it compels the conclusion that
existing representative arrangements, however flawed, must be
superior to what passes as constitutional reasoning in the courts.
A. Robert Nagel
First, consider Professor Nagel's lively Nationalized Political
Discourse.37 Nagel's response to the implications of asymmetry might
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
36. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
37. Robert F. Nagel, Nationalized Political Discourse, 69 Fordham L Rev. 2057
2001] 2079
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be termed "counter-attack." At its most general level, counter-attack
rests on the premise that certain constitutional norms are sufficiently
clear and legitimate that they not only sustain the exercise of judicial
review, but judicial review in ways that shape the democratic
alternative itself. Probably the most powerful examples of this instinct
are the representation reinforcement-process-based theories running
from Cass Sunstein38 through John Hart Ely 9 back to footnote 4 in
United States v. Carolene Products Co.41 Uniting these theories is the
conviction that whatever else the Constitution mandates, it is robust
self-government. So strong is this conviction that it paradoxically
authorizes the courts to aggressively police the institutions of self-
government and thus reinvigorate the democratic process. The
nagging asymmetrical problem, however, is that the same lawyers who
can plausibly justify these constitutional commitments likely lack the
parallel expertise about the democratic process itself to cash out
workable solutions. Where, for example, Justice Harlan sees "discrete
and insular minorities"41 as the paradigm for democratic process
breakdown, Bruce Ackerman counters that these are just the groups
that ordinarily thrive.42
Professor Nagel's counter-offensive proceeds in this same general
direction, even if it does not follow precisely the same route. Where,
for example, process-theorists privilege representation
reinforcement,43 Nationalized Political Discourse effectively treats the
quality of political discussion as a constitutional value worthy of
similar respect. Nagel does not attempt to ground this value in text,
structure, or other sources of constitutional meaning in the way that,
say, Justice Harlan does in Carolene Products." That is not the focus
of this article. But Nagel certainly could, especially given the more
than passing family resemblance between the elevated discourse he
extols and the requirement of adequate "deliberation" championed by
an array of scholars. 5 The constitutional commitment in hand, Nagel
suggests that one doctrinal device that could elevate our political
discourse is a more state-oriented federalism.46 Once again, this piece
does not attempt to demonstrate how the courts could implement this
(2001).
38. Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993).
39. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980).
40. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
41. Id. at 153 n.4.
42. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713 passim
(1985).
43. Ely, supra note 39, at 73-104.
44. Nagel, supra note 37; Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
45. Bruce Ackerman, We the People 1: Foundations 197-98 (1991) [hereinafter
Ackerman, We the People]; Sunstein, supra note 38, at 133-45; James E. Fleming,
Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
46. Nagel, supra note 37, at 2072.
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mechanism. Yet once more, it could do so, especially given the
Supreme Court's recent excursions into "states' rights."47
What Nagel does concentrate on is the entertaining, yet depressing,
evidence that points him toward his proposed solution. As his many
anecdotes show, there is more than a little evidence to suggest that
political dialogue at the state level is "bland, insubstantial, derivative,"
while discourse at the national level tends to be "spectacular, extreme,
dishonest, personalized, polarized, and staged."' In concentrating on
the actual workings of self-government rather than the nuances of
interpretation, the article goes a considerable distance to avoid
making easy, asymmetrical assumptions. This is exactly the right
inquiry.
Whether the inquiry has led to the correct diagnosis is another
matter. At least from a vantage point in the heart of New York City,
nearly the opposite intuitions about the nature of current political
discourse obtain. As a thought experiment, think of such national
politicians as Al Gore and George W. Bush on one hand, and favorite
sons Rudolph Giuliani and Al Sharpton on the other. Then ask which
pair conjures up images of bland and insubstantial versus spectacular,
polarized, and staged. 9 Nagel may well be right that this anomaly
only goes to show that the nation's largest city more closely resembles
more typical national politics than does a more representative
locality. 0 Still, further answers are likely needed to Nagel's correct
questions.
B. Lawrence Sager
Lawrence Sager's work5 also proposes a counter-offensive, one that
appears more modest but winds up as more aggressive. In the context
of constitutional asymmetry, his approach might usefully be thought
of as "expansionist." Employing tried-and-true lawyerly methods of
constitutional interpretation, Sager remains one of the leading
47. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (holding that by regulating the
sale of motor vehicle information, Congress is not impinging upon state sovereignty);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Article I power does not include
the power to subject an unconsenting state to private suit in state court); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that state officials cannot be compelled to
participate in the administration of a federal program).
48. Nagel, supra note 37, at 2068.
49. See, e.g., 'Yo Mama' Rips Rudy, Daily News (New York), Feb. 16, 2001, at 1
("Photog-model in museum flap [about photograph of the "Last Supper" with nude
African-American women posing as Christ) blasts mayor as he calls for 'decency'
panel to approve art.").
50. Colloquy, The Constitution Outside the Courts and the Pursuit of a Good
Society, A Conference on the Constitution and the Good Society at Fordham Law
School 357-58 (Sept. 23, 2000) (transcript on file with Fordham Law Review).
51. See eg., Lawrence G. Sager, Thin Constitutions and the Good Society, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 1989 (2001).
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proponents of a "justice-seeking" Constitution.52 In a great many
instances, moreover, justice under the Constitution may appropriately
and effectively be sought through the courts.5 3
Sager's pioneering-and expansionist-twist was to argue that
constitutional norms remained norms even in those instances in which
it was inadvisable, impractical, or unlikely for courts to implement
them.' Conventionally, such "positive" rights as social welfare,
education, and health-which call upon the government to enforce
affirmative steps -constitute the usual suspects. As fully
constitutional principles, these and others nonetheless remain binding
on government officials who should be held accountable both by each
other and the public when such "underenforced norms" are ignored.
Despite the name, the idea of "underenforced norms" actually seeks
to expand the relevance of constitutional principles in the democratic
process. As such, Sager's expansionist approach is especially
attractive.
Just at this point, however, the specter of asymmetry reintrudes.
How plausible is it that legislators, executive officers, and government
officials will internalize constitutional norms? As I have argued,
lawyers, judges, and law professors are ordinarily not the best placed
professionals to answer this sort of question. That said, comparative
law does suggest a hopeful conclusion, though it also points to a
caveat. On the plus side, international human rights law often
expressly articulates positive norms that are considered binding but
not conventionally enforceable. For example, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as an
international treaty, compels participating governments to take
progressive steps to provide adequate education, social welfare, and
health services.55 Reports on how well particular governments adhere
to these standards clearly provide incentives for governments to take
52. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410, 416 (1993); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The
Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional Justice, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1611,
1615-16 (1997).
53. Professors Sager and Tushnet thus differ in at least two crucial respects. As
Tushnet points out, they both extol the "thin" Constitution in the sense of core
constitutional commitments to justice, dignity, and equality, as opposed to "thick,"
detailed provisions establishing government. Tushnet, Constitution-Talk, supra note 3,
at 1999-2000. They nonetheless differ for two reasons. First, Tushnet derives these
principles from the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble while Sager finds
them in more orthodox constitutional sources. Second, Sager retains faith in judicial
review, while Tushnet proposes making the Constitution non-justiciable. Tushnet,
Taking the Constitution Away, supra note 4, at 175.
54. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1220-22 (1978).
55. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, arts. 11-13 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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them seriously. 6  Conversely, the international experience also
indicates a way in which the concept of underenforcement can
boomerang. It may be that reliance on underenforcement leads to a
diminution of rights that can be enforced in a stronger sense. Many in
the international human rights movement aspire to build upon
reporting systems to create stronger, court-like mechanisms for
implementing positive rights. Would we in the United States give up
the prospect of employing the courts we already have to enforce such
rights if the serious, yet (arguably) weaker, alternative of non-judicial
enforcement were in place?
C. Mary Becker
With Mary Becker's Towards a Progressive Politics and a
Progressive Constitution,.' we reverse field. Even more than Tushnet,
she seeks not to work within our modern, court-centered
constitutional order, but instead would reform it root and branch.
Her ambitious program exemplifies the kind of constitutional
aspirations Bruce Ackerman has called, "transformative," 5 -in this
case a self-consciously transformative progressivism. And like more
classical progressives before her, Becker bases her proposals on
thorough empirical and comparative studies, as opposed to deduction
from current constitutional doctrine. So thorough is her approach in
this regard that the method is almost a mirror image of the asymmetry
previously seen. In particular, she derives her desired norms from the
social needs she documents rather than interpretive theory.5 9 When,
moreover, she does invoke legal materials to support her call for
equality and caring, they are international human rights standards,
which among other things demonstrate the possibility of fashioning
the commitments she seeks.60 If this is asymmetry, it is also a tonic
given the usual imbalance in constitutional analysis.
Not surprisingly, Becker's method makes for exceptionally rich
reading when it comes to her own discussion of democratic processes.
No American should be able to look at the article's several tables
showing the comparative absence of women in legislative positions
56. See, eg., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Articles
16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Comnnittee on Economic,
Socia4 and Cultural Rights, Nigeria, U.N. Comm. on Econ. Soc. and Cultural Rts.,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/l/Add.23 (1998); Myron Weiner, The Child and the State in India:
Child Labor and Education Policy in Comparative Perspective 3 (1991). reprinted in
Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law,
Politics, Morals 287-89 (1996).
57. Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive Politics and a Progressive Constitution,
69 Fordharn L. Rev. 2007 (2001).
58. Ackerman, We the People, supra note 45, at 19, 30-31.
59. Becker, supra note 57, at Part I.A., I.B.
60. Id. at Part I.A.4.
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without embarrassment bordering on shame.61 Moreover, the article's
analysis of such solutions as cumulative and proportional voting
schemes-to overhaul what Tushnet calls the "thick" Constitution-
represents precisely the type of discussion that constitutional
asymmetry usually precludes.6'
Also not surprisingly, the rare instances in which Becker's
treatment does fall prey to the more usual type of imbalanced analysis
produce its more debatable claims. As one of its concluding
recommendations, the article proposes a more limited version of
judicial review based on the supposition that courts will more often
than not select the more socially regressive option among the
available constitutional choices. That may be. Becker cites the anti-
democratic Buckley v. Valeo63 and the retrograde United States v.
Morrison' as recent examples, and with the current Supreme Court,
she could certainly cite many more. But this general proposition may
not be as well. The same Court that produced Buckley and Morrison
was also capable of Craig v. Boren65 and Romer v. Evans.' It remains
unclear-and highly contested-how judicial review cuts as a general
matter. The baby might be worth throwing out, but we should think
twice before we do.
D. Mark Tushnet
Which brings us to Mark Tushnet. Tushnet's present article,
Constitution-Talk and Justice-Talk67 follows up on his recent book,
Taking the Constitution Away From The Courts,' a "populist"
manifesto that cements his reputation as the nation's most brilliantly
provocative constitutional scholar. Tushnet's populism also seeks to
reduce, indeed eliminate, the role of the courts in constitutional law.
In doubly provocative fashion, he gets there not by detailed analysis
of democratic process, but through legal critique-in short, by
suggesting the power of constitutional asymmetry.
That power derives from the law's ability to demonstrate how little
the law does or ought to matter. Constitution-Talk and Justice-Talk
does this by arguing how little constitutional discourse contributes to
the pursuit of justice. On this view, much (though not all) justice-
seeking constitutional theory is derivative of philosophical justice-
seeking; the "thick" Constitution of governmental structure does not
61. Id. at Part I.B.4.
62. Id. at Part I.B.4, IV.A.
63, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
64. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
65. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
66. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
67. Tushnet, Constitution-Talk, supra note 3.
68. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away, supra note 4.
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speak to justice; and even the "thin" Constitution of the Declaration
and Preamble fails to prescribe outcomes precisely because it is
"thin." These points, in turn, build upon Tushnet's larger populist
project. There among his key claims is that judicial review has done
little to constrain dominant political coalitions, has reduced what
should be popular discourse to lawyerly jargon, and has never
consistently stood for anything more precise than the "thin"
Constitution in any event. 69 These insights in turn follow from
Tushnet's earlier work which famously argues that the constitutional
theory does not provide bases to constrain judicial decision-making so
much as furnish grounds to critique the courts for decisions based on
political factors."
And yet. Powerful as critique is in Tushnet's hands, the question
remains whether similar scrutiny of the democratic alternative would
lead to similar dissatisfaction. Taking the Constitution A way From the
Courts does draw upon case law, history, and political science
literature to support the propositions that the Supreme Court has
largely been irrelevant and that an attractive, self-enforcing
Constitution is possible." Tushnet does, however, admit that some of
his evidence about democratic process is not uncontroversial.- More
importantly, the thesis that populist constitutionalism would be
superior to the court-centered brand must in critical respects remain
counter-factual (at least until attempted). We cannot know with any
confidence whether the judiciary makes a positive difference unless
we have a go without it.73
In this regard, one fruitful way forward is through comparative law.
How similarly situated nations perform with or without court-
centered constitutionalism probably comes as close as we are likely to
get to controlled experiments testing the populist, counter-factual
notion. Tushnet, moreover, would not disagree, as his own
comparisons -with Ireland, Israel, and India show. 4 Yet Becker's
article demonstrates that such comparative work is no small task.
Once undertaken, however, such work may indeed show that the
69. See id. passim.
70. See Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Law 4 (1988).
71. Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away, supra note 4, at 95-153.
72. Id. at 127.
73. A similar problem confronts the exemplary and provocative works of Michael
Klarman, who argues that judicial review simply has not greatly mattered in the
course of American history. See, eg., Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and
Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L Rev. 1881
(1995); Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 Vand. L
Rev. 881 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1996).
74. See Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away, supra note 4, at 159, 169-70; Vicki
C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law 641-50 (1999).
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premises underlying Tushnet's reform are sufficiently plausible that it
merits taking the plunge.
For the moment, however, the United Kingdom perhaps provides a
cautionary tale. Not only is Britain similar to the United States in
most relevant respects, it all but embodies the type of populist
constitutionalism Tushnet extols. Yet as bad as the United States
criminal justice system may be, the United Kingdom's is in specific
respects demonstrably worse, from the possibility of seven-day
incarceration before seeing a magistrate, to denial of access to counsel
during interrogation, to a significantly reduced right to silence.75 In
each key respect, the difference would seem to turn on judicial
intervention in the United States and the lack of that option in the
United Kingdom. Significantly, Britain has recently moved toward
judge-centered constitutionalism by incorporating the European
Convention for Human Rights into domestic law. 76
CONCLUSION
Then again, Britain took this step before Bush v. Gore.' If, in the
end, constitutional asymmetry does continue to push the Constitution
toward the democratic process, the Supreme Court may have no one
to blame but itself. The nagging problem is that the facts underlying
the case suggest that assigning the Constitution to the democratic
process is not necessarily the same thing as giving it back to the
people.
75. See Martin S. Flaherty, Interrogation, Legal Advice, and Human Rights in
Northern Ireland, 27 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 3-5 (1995); Martin Flaherty, Human
Rights Violations Against Defense Lawyers: The Case of Northern Ireland, 7 Harv.
Hum. Rts. J. 87, 111-12 (1994); Molly R. Murphy, Northern Ireland Policing Reform
and the Intimidation of Defense Lawyers, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 1877, 1886-89 (2000).
76. Human Rights Act of 1998, entered into force Oct. 2, 2000 (Eng.); see also
David Pannick, What Could Be More British?, The Times (London), Oct. 3, 2000
(describing the Human Rights Act of 1998 that came into force on Oct. 2,2000).
77. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
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